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Abstract
This paper analyzes the utilization of repression and democratic institutions by a
non-democratic government striving for political power and private rents. We find
that economic development has different impacts on policy choices, depending on
whether it appears in the form of rises in income or in education: A higher income
level reduces democracy, whereas more education leads to both more democracy
and more repression. These theoretical findings are corroborated by panel data
regressions.
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1 Introduction
Lipset’s (1959) modernization theory, positing that economic development induces and
consolidates democracy, has undergone massive scrutiny in recent literature (e.g. Ace-
moglu et al., 2008; Benhabib et al., 2013; Heid et al., 2012; Moral-Benito and Bartolucci,
2012). Matters are particularly controversial for countries with low democracy levels whose
regimes are usually found to be stabilized by growing per capita incomes (e.g. Ulfelder,
2007). Moreover, there is evidence that non-democratic leaders secure office not only by
relying on repression but also by implementing some democratic institutions (Gandhi and
Przeworski, 2007).
Building on these observations, we provide a detailed analysis of the utilization of both
democratic institutions and repression by non-democratic governments. We adopt an
elaborate view on modernization by disentangling income and education as different facets
of economic development. This matters because non-democratic leaders react to rises
in income and education in different ways: A higher level of education leads to more
democracy and more repression, whereas rises in income dismantle democratic structures.
Derived theoretically in Section 2, these results are corroborated in Section 3 by panel
data regressions for several indicators of democracy and human rights violations.
2 The Model
Consider a non-democratic leader L in the spirit of Wintrobe (1990), deriving utility from
political power p and private consumption c:
UL = u(p) + v(c), (1)
where u(·) and v(·) are well-behaved concave functions (u′ > 0 > u′′, v′ > 0 > v′′) ensuring
interior solutions for the sake of convenience.
L raises a budget B by taxing income y at rate τ , leaving the population with net income
(1 − τ)y.1 The relation between tax rate and revenues is of a Laffer-type: B = q(τ) · y
with q′(0) ∈ (0, 1], q′′(τ) < 0, and q′(τ̂) = 0, τ̂ ≤ 1.
Political power p is measured by the extent to which L can act at her own discretion.
Obviously, p is inversely related to democracy due to institutional constraints arising from
a constitution, an independent legislature, modes of political competition, etcetera. De-
noting the level of democracy by d ∈ [0, d̄], with d̄ as the maximum degree of democracy
an autocratic regime can offer, we express political power as: p = d̄− d.
L can lose office by a revolution only. The mobilization potential of insurgents increases in
the dissatisfaction of the general population. The utility of the latter depends on economic
1We normalize population size to unity. Hence, y denotes both per capita and total income.
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and political satisfaction according to:
UP = w((1− τ)y) + s(d− e),
where w(·) and s(·) are well-behaved concave functions (w′ > 0 > w′′, s′ > 0 > s′′). While
economic satisfaction is driven by net income, political satisfaction depends on the differ-
ence between supply and demand for democracy. Consistent with Lipset (1959), the latter
is represented by the level of education e, diminishing political satisfaction from a given
democracy level.
Following Bar-El (2009), members of the general population are dissatisfied when L pro-
vides too low utility. Threshold utility levels being uniformly distributed in the interval
[U,U ] with δ = U − U , the dissatisfied share of the general population is:
N = 1− w((1− τ)y) + s(d− e)− U
δ
. (2)
In order to prevent the mobilization of N and maintain regime stability, L must exert
repression. With φ as the per capita cost of containing the dissatisfied, repression expen-
ditures amount to:
r = φ ·N = φ
(
1− w((1− τ)y) + s(d− e)− U
δ
)
. (3)
As c = B − r, these expenditures reduce L’s private consumption.
Summing up, L chooses the level of democracy and the tax rate in order to maximize
utility subject to the requirement that supporters of insurgents be controlled. Formally
spoken:
max
d,τ
u
(
d̄− d
)
+ v (q(τ)y − r) , (4)
with r given by (3). Using ϕ = φ/δ for notational brevity, first order conditions become:
d : −u′(d̄− d) + v′(q(τ)y − r) · ϕ · s′(d− e) = 0, (5)
τ : v′(q(τ)y − r)[q′(τ)y − ϕ · w′((1− τ)y) · y] = 0. (6)
Applying Cramers Rule yields:
dd
dy
= −ϕ · v
′′s′ · (q + ϕ · w′ · (1− τ))
u′′ + ϕ · v′s′′ + ϕ2 · v′′(s′)2
< 0, (7)
dτ
dy
=
ϕ · w′′ · (1− τ)
q′′ + ϕ · w′′ · y
> 0, (8)
dd
de
=
ϕ2 · v′′(s′)2 + ϕ · v′s′′
u′′ + ϕ · v′s′′ + ϕ2 · v′′(s′)2
> 0, (9)
dτ
de
= 0. (10)
A higher per capita income increases the tax rate and weakens democratic institutions,
whereas a more educated population leads to more democracy without inducing tax rate
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changes. Utilizing (7)-(9), we find that repression reacts ambiguously on y and increases
in e:
dr
dy
= −ϕ
(
w′ ·
(
1− τ − y · dτ
dy
)
+ s′ · dd
dy
)
(11)
= −ϕ
(
q′′w′ · (1− τ)
q′′ + ϕ · w′′ · y
− ϕ · v
′′(s′)2(q + ϕ · w′ · (1− τ))
u′′ + ϕ · v′s′′ + ϕ2 · v′′(s′)2
)
R 0, (12)
dr
de
= ϕ · s′ ·
(
1− dd
de
)
=
ϕ · s′u′′
u′′ + ϕ · v′s′′ + ϕ2 · v′′(s′)2
> 0. (13)
These findings have a plain interpretation. A higher per capita income diminishes economic
dissatisfaction as the net income of the population grows (d(1−τ)ydy = 1 − τ − y ·
dτ
dy > 0).
However, higher tax revenues (dBdy = q+q
′ · dτdy ·y > 0) spur L’s demand for political power.
The resulting dismantlement of democracy increases political dissatisfaction. Therefore,
economic and political discontent move in opposite directions and the effect on overall
dissatisfaction and hence on repression is ambiguous. In contrast, a higher education level
definitely reinforces dissatisfaction. Minimizing utility losses by sacrificing both political
power and private consumption, L increases democracy and repression.
We abstain from investigating the ambiguous relation between r and y explicitly.2 More-
over, lacking data on tax rates prevent testing the effects of income and education on τ .
Thus, the next section addresses the following hypotheses:
Hyd : A higher per capita income is associated with a lower level of democracy.
Hed : A higher level of education is associated with a higher level of democracy.
Her : A higher level of education is associated with a higher level of repression.
3 Empirical Evidence
We employ various measures of democracy and repression. Regarding the former, we take
the “Polity scores”, an aggregate democracy index ranging in discrete steps between -10
(full autocracy) and 10 (full democracy), as well as the concept variables ”political com-
petition”, ”executive constraints” and ”executive recruitment” from the Polity IV dataset
(Marshall and Gurr, 2016). Additionally, we consider the Freedom House Political Rights
Index (FHPR) (Freedom House, 2016). Repression is measured by the ”Amnesty scores”
and the ”State Department scores” of the Political Terror Scale (Gibney et al., 2016) as
well as the ”Physical Integrity Rights Index” of the CIRI Human Rights Data Project
(Cingranelli et al., 2014). All indices are (re)coded such that higher values indicate higher
levels of democracy and repression, respectively.
Income and education are operationalized by GDP per capita (in mil. 2011 US$ PPP)
from the Penn World Table 9.0 (Feenstra et al., 2015) and the average years of schooling
of the population aged 25 and over (Barro and Lee, 2013). As controls, we use data on
natural resources rents and population density (World Bank, 2016), on ethnic and religious
fractionalization (Alesina et al., 2003), and on the number of bordering countries and the
2Nevertheless, Table 1 reports regression results.
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magnitudes of intrastate and interstate conflict (Marshall, 2016).
The sample is restricted to non-democracies, characterized by a “Polity score” of at most
5 in the respective year. This yields an unbalanced panel of 88 countries in the period
from 1970 to 2014. We employ time period averages of 5 and 10 years as governments
may adjust repression and democracy to changes in income and education with a time
lag of unapparent length. Explanatory variables enter as arithmetic means. Dependent
variables are ordinal. Thus, we apply their medians3 and use (proportional odds) ordered
logistic regression models with random effects specifying the probability of an outcome
yit > k for country i in time period t as:
4
Pr(yit > k|κ,xit, vi) = F (xitβ + vi − κk). (14)
Here, x and β denote explanatory variables and regression coefficients, respectively. κ =
κ1, κ2, . . . , κK is a set of cutpoints for the K possible outcomes, vi
i.i.d.∼ N(0, σ2) is a
country-specific effect and F (·) denotes the logistic cumulative distribution function. We
transform regression coefficients into odds ratios which indicate negative (positive) asso-
ciations for values smaller (greater) than 1. GDP per capita, years of schooling, resources
rents, and population density enter as logarithms to base 2. This accounts for their highly
skewed distributions and allows the respective odds ratios to be interpreted as changes
from doubling the value of these explanatory variables. Standard error estimators are
specified as robust against heteroscedasticity and serial correlation within countries.
Table 1 shows the regression outcomes. For all democracy indicators, we find a negative
relationship with GDP per capita (odds ratios smaller than 1). Except for the FHPR,
these relationships are statistically significant, confirming hypothesis Hyd . Estimated ef-
fect sizes vary across dependent variables. A particularly large negative effect of income
arises for ”political competition” in the 5-years sample where the odds of a higher score
decline by more than 75 % when income doubles. A rise in average years of schooling,
however, tends to go along with higher democracy scores. For all indicators, odds ratios
are significant at the 1 % level and exceed 1, corroborating hypothesis Hed . Again, the ef-
fect is considerably large for ”political competition” in the 5-years sample. Here, the odds
of higher competition are predicted to increase by more than the 15-fold when years of
schooling double. Interestingly, control variables show no conclusive pattern with respect
to democracy levels.
Regarding repression, estimation results point to a positive association with education,
clearly supporting hypothesis Her . Once again, regression coefficients are statistically
significant at the 1 % level. Doubling years of schooling is predicted to change the odds for
a higher repression category by a factor between 1.84 and 4.89 (“Amnesty scores”, 5-years
sample and “State Department scores”, 10-years sample, respectively). Regarding control
variables, repression is found to be higher in countries with higher natural resources rents,
3To avoid the generation of intermediate categories with a small number of observations potentially
leading to convergence problems in estimation, all non-integer median values are rounded up.
4Treating our dependent variables as continuous and applying fixed effects regression yields qualitatively
similar results. Regression tables are available upon request.
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population densities, magnitudes of intrastate conflict and many neighbors.
4 Conclusion
We provide theoretical and empirical evidence that non-democratic governments respond
differently to economic development, depending on whether it appears in the form of
increasing education or per capita income. To disentangle effects, we have abstracted
from the impact of education on income and vice versa. Accounting for such interrelations
would be a promising extension which we leave for future research.
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